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INCREMENTALIST VS. MAXIMALIST REFORM:
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT CASE STUDIES
Margo Schlanger
ABSTRACT—Among criminal justice reformers, it has long been hotly
contested whether moderate reform helps or harms more efforts to achieve
more thoroughgoing change. With respect to solitary confinement, do partial
and ameliorative measures undermine the goal of solitary confinement
abolition? Or do reformist campaigns advance—albeit incrementally—that
ultimate goal? Call this a debate between “incrementalists” and
“maximalists.” I offer this Essay as an appeal for empirical rather than
aesthetic inquiry into the question. After summarizing nationwide reform
litigation efforts that began in the 1970s, I try to shed some factual light by
examining solitary reform efforts in two states, Massachusetts and Indiana.
In Massachusetts, early incremental reforms may be providing a blueprint
for deeper depopulation of solitary confinement—though the matter is still
highly contested. In Indiana, incremental reforms seem to be less effective
at achieving deeper depopulation. I offer some hypotheses about the sources
of the difference.
The evidence suggests that for litigation to trigger broad reform, or
significant steps towards solitary abolition, allies are required. In
Massachusetts, the political ecosystem has many more reform-minded
participants—activists, lawyers, judges, legislators—than does the much
redder Indiana. Each such participant can build on the others. In
Massachusetts, litigation’s strengths—information generation, thoughtful
policy development (codified in settlement documents), publicity, and
storytelling—can emerge. Weaknesses—the detachment of litigation from
mobilization, hyper-empowerment of lawyers, undue affection for process—
are ameliorated by other actors and other actions. The Indiana ecosystem is
far less hospitable to solitary confinement change.
There is no sign that the limited reformist measures in Massachusetts
and Indiana have been perverse, as maximalists might predict. Neither state
has seen an increase in the use of solitary confinement or reported worsening
of conditions in solitary. In neither state is there any sign that the litigated
amelioration of solitary confinement has entrenched or legitimated solitary
confinement more broadly.
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INTRODUCTION
Solitary confinement and efforts to reform it are as old as American
imprisonment.1 And when modern long-term solitary confinement emerged
in the early 1980s with the rise of the “supermax,”2 a reform movement
followed essentially immediately. Many or even most of the modern
movement’s advocates have made it their goal to abolish solitary, not merely
reduce it: the American Friends Service Committee, for example, named its
campaign STOPMAX,3 and the ACLU calls its successor campaign Stop
Solitary.4 But, as described below, much of the advocacy, and particularly

1

See, e.g., David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789–1865, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 111, 116–24 (Norval
Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995).
2
See CHASE RIVELAND, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., SUPERMAX PRISONS: OVERVIEW AND GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS 1, 5 (1999).
3
See Healing Justice, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMMITTEE, https://www.afsc.org/stopmax
[https://perma.cc/4KJW-PLK3].
4
See We Can Stop Solitary, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/prisoners-rights/solitaryconfinement/we-can-stop-solitary [https://perma.cc/DZD6-XKKC].

274

115:273 (2020)

Incrementalist vs. Maximalist Reform

the litigation, has been more modest—seeking to tighten up the procedure
used to assign prisoners to solitary, improve the conditions within solitary,
and bar particularly vulnerable populations (prisoners with serious mental
illness, pregnant women, and so on) from solitary.
With respect to criminal justice more generally—and, indeed, leftleaning campaigns altogether—it has long been hotly contested whether
moderate reform helps or harms more thoroughgoing advocacy efforts
(consider the current prison abolition and “defund the police” movements).
Do partial and ameliorative measures undermine the goal of solitary
confinement abolition? Or do they advance—albeit incrementally—that
ultimate goal?5
Call adherents to the incrementalism-skeptical position “maximalists.”
There are two chief maximalist arguments. First, a normalization argument 6
suggests that modest reforms tend to normalize the use of solitary
confinement—to imply that solitary confinement is acceptable if it is hedged
by the right procedures, softened by the right environmental conditions, and
imposed on the right populations.7 For example, arguing that solitary is
particularly inappropriate for certain populations of prisoners can be
5
To try to shed light on this question, I lean on the written sources cited throughout and on telephone
interviews I conducted with over a dozen experienced prisoners’ rights advocates: Tom Crishon,
Managing Att’y, Ind. Disability Rights (Mar. 11, 2020); Philip Desgranges, Senior Staff Att’y, NYCLU,
& Alex Reinert, Max Freund Professor of Litig. & Advocacy & Dir., Ctr. for Rights & Justice, Cardozo
Law Sch. (Oct. 15, 2019); Kenneth Falk, Legal Dir. ACLU of Ind. (Feb. 6 & 11, 2020); Jamie Fellner,
former Senior Counsel for the U.S. Program of Human Rights Watch (Feb. 13, 2020); Amy Fettig, thenDeputy Dir., ACLU Nat’l Prison Project & Dir., ACLU Stop Solitary Campaign (Oct. 23, 2019); Maggie
Filler, Att’y, MacArthur Justice Ctr. (Feb. 13, 2020); Robert Fleischner, former Att’y, Ctr. for Pub.
Representation & member, Mass. Restrictive Hous. Oversight Comm. (Oct. 15, 2019); Melissa Keyes,
Exec. Dir., Ind. Disability Rights (Feb. 13, 2020); Rachel Meeropol, Senior Staff Att’y, Ctr. for
Constitutional Rights (Oct. 16, 2019); Karen Murtagh, Exec. Dir., Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of N.Y. (Nov.
15, 2019); James Pingeon, Litig. Dir., Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of Mass. (Oct. 21, 2019); Kelly Tautges,
Pro Bono Counsel & Dir., Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP & Dan Kelley, Assoc., Faegre Drinker
Biddle & Reath LLP (Mar. 12, 2020). I also come to the topic with substantial advocacy experience of
my own, which obviously influences my analysis.
6
For an analysis in the context of death penalty abolitionist work that separates normalization into
“entrenchment” and “legitimation,” see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Lessons for Law Reform
from the American Experiment with Capital Punishment, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 748–54 (2014)
[hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Lessons for Law Reform]; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should
Abolitionists Support Legislative “Reform” of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 421–24 (2002)
[hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Legislative “Reform”]. On these accounts, entrenchment “occurs when
incremental reform unequivocally offers improvements along some key dimension or dimensions of the
problem and thus makes the case for larger-scale change less urgent,” and legitimation “occurs when
incremental reforms promote an exaggerated or false confidence (in the reliability, fairness, wisdom, etc.)
of the system or practice subject to reform.” Steiker & Steiker, Lessons for Law Reform, supra, at 749.
When I refer to “normalization,” I intend to encompass both.
7
See Keramet Reiter, The International Persistence and Resilience of Solitary Confinement, 8 OÑATI
SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 247, 255 (2018).
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understood to accede to its appropriateness for others. Thus, maximalists
argue, vulnerable-populations reforms may entrench the practice of solitary
confinement for some prisoners, even as those reforms rule out solitary for
others. Professor Keramet Reiter writes, along these lines:
[R]eform efforts targeting protected categories like the young, or the mentally
ill, or more recently, pregnant women, leave behind a core of people who are
not young, not (yet) mentally ill, not pregnant, and therefore not deserving of
protection. This durable core of punishable subjects becomes an ongoing
justification for the need for solitary confinement . . . . In sum, many attempts
to improve conditions of confinement in solitary, or to limit its imposition on
some vulnerable groups, have been positive, reformist efforts, ultimately
bolstering the legitimacy of the existing system, rather than negative, nonreformist or abolitionist, efforts, with the potential to challenge the legitimacy
of systems of solitary confinement.8

The second chief maximalist argument is about bandwidth and is
conceptually distinct. It points to the hard-to-escape reality that reform
attention is scarce.9 If that limited resource is used up on, for example,
barring pregnant women from solitary, that leaves the vast majority of
prisoners with less advocacy energy devoted to their situations.
In contrast to maximalists, “incrementalists” believe that a modest
approach is often best suited to bring about the shared abolitionist (or closeto-abolitionist) goal. Incrementalists argue that shrinking the number of
prisoners in solitary will help not just those who are rehoused in less brutal
conditions, but also those who remain in solitary. The normalization problem
can be avoided, they say, by careful framing and empathetic language. This
is how prisoners’ rights lawyer Jim Pingeon describes his anti-solitary
litigation efforts, which have been decidedly incremental:
The whole debate . . . was framed . . . . It wasn’t just, “Solitary is a terrible
place, but some people can tolerate it,” it [was,] “Solitary is terrible and it’s
really, really terrible for some people and we should absolutely make sure that
they don’t go there, but we should also start making it harder for anybody to go
there. And I think that that message was a fairly effective one and certainly
more effective than if you just said, “Well, [solitary is] bad for everyone.”10

And Amy Fettig, then-head of the ACLU’s Stop Solitary campaign, puts it
this way:

8

Id. (citation omitted).
See Proceedings of a Colloquium to Further a National Consensus on Ending the Over-Use of
Extreme Isolation in Prisons, JOHN JAY C. OF JUST. (2015).
10
Telephone Interview with James Pingeon, supra note 5.
9
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[I]f you raise up the worst case first, [the cases] that people can identify with—
kids, folks with mental illness, pregnant women—you actually normalize
change within corrections so that they are examples of other things that
work . . . . [E]specially when we’re dealing with these closed institutions, we
can’t actually create change on the ground unless there is some willingness on
the part of those institutions to change. And so [incremental reform is] actually
softening up the ground. It’s building the skill base and, frankly, the moral
framework, for change to happen. Then social forces on the outside actually
effectuate real change on the inside.11

As Fettig makes clear, incrementalists offer arguments about increasing
technocratic capacity, suggesting that in moving a particular group of
prisoners out of solitary, prison and jail officials develop alternative housing
and custody strategies and facilities, which can then be extended. Solving a
slice of a problem may enable officials to see how they can address the
remainder—as long as the remainder continues to be perceived as a problem.
It is the role of advocates to ensure that solitary confinement continues to be
seen as a problem. Incrementalists often argue, too, that bandwidth
limitations actually cut in favor of incrementalism because once the most
egregious suffering from solitary is solved—the most vulnerable prisoners
taken out of solitary confinement, for example—reform can move on to
focus on slightly less urgent but more widespread issues. In addition,
economies of scale may mean that when supermax solitary units are
sufficiently depopulated, their elevated per-prisoner cost may become
unsustainable politically.
The incrementalist versus maximalist debate is a cousin of the standard
liberal versus left debate opposing ameliorationist reform to deeper, more
structural, more radical action. In the particular setting of solitary
confinement, where maximalists and incrementalists largely share a
maximalist goal and disagree only about strategy, the anti-incrementalist
argument sounds in perversity—it claims that reformers’ attempts to
improve or minimize solitary confinement will not only fail, but are
counterproductive, entrenching and worsening the existing cruel system. 12
Professor Albert Hirschman, in The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity,
Futility, Jeopardy, analyzes the appeal of the perversity argument as a
reactionary trope: “What better way to show [a reformer] up as half foolish
11

Telephone Interview with Amy Fettig, supra note 5.
The three paragraphs that follow are adapted from my own prior work. See Margo Schlanger, No
Reason to Blame Liberals (Or, The Unbearable Lightness of Perversity Arguments), NEW RAMBLER
(June 15, 2015) (reviewing NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON
AMERICA (2014)), https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/no-reason-to-blame-liberals-or-theunbearable-lightness-of-perversity-arguments [https://perma.cc/QD7Q-PT5W].
12
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and half criminal than to prove that he is achieving the exact opposite of what
he is proclaiming as his objective?”13 Professor Hirschman argues that
conservatives are particularly drawn to perversity arguments because they
are a way to deride purportedly public-spirited reform.14 This nicely
supplements the conservative commitment to self-interest that (via the
invisible hand doctrine of Adam Smith15) serves the public good. But as
Professor Hirschman says, perversity arguments are not “the exclusive
property of ‘reactionaries.’”16 And actually, perversity arguments are just as
much a hallmark of left/radical attacks on liberalism/reformism. A classic
radical argument, founded in Marxist dialectical thought, is to promote
drastic but salutary change (that is, revolution) by making the current state
of affairs more intolerable. The idea, often tagged with the imperative
“heighten the contradictions,” is that if things get worse for the oppressed,
that will spur much needed radical solutions. The concomitant claim is that
moderate reform, by dulling “contradictions,” perversely makes things
worse for its purported beneficiaries.17
Indeed, perversity arguments are appealing not only to reactionaries and
the left-of-liberal left but to academics, regardless of ideology. As Professor
Hirschman said, a perversity argument “is, at first blush, a daring intellectual
maneuver. The structure of the argument is admirably simple, whereas the
claim being made is rather extreme.”18 Perversity arguments are
counterintuitive, attention-grabbing. These are attractive characteristics if
the goal is to stand out in a crowd of monographs. And sure enough, the
attack on liberalism as perversely harming the disempowered has become
quite fashionable in criminal justice scholarship in particular. Professor Bill
Stuntz was its most well-known (and perhaps least radical) author, but
structurally similar claims have sprouted up all over, usually from the left.
These are arguments that prison-conditions litigation causes an increase in

13
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 19
(1991).
14
See id. at 12.
15
See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456
(R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner & W. B. Todd eds., Liberty Classics 1976) (1776).
16
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 13, at 7.
17
See, e.g., VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, The Heritage We Renounce, reprinted in 2 LENIN’S
COLLECTED WORKS (George Hanna ed., Yuri Sdobnikov & George Hanna trans., Progress Publishers
1972)
(1898),
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1897/dec/31c.htm
[https://perma.cc/WD9E-9RKR]; ROSA LUXEMBURG, REFORM OR REVOLUTION (1900),
https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1900/reform-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/7VDN-AZ8Q].
18
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 13, at 11.
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incarceration,19 Miranda rights cause increased arrests,20 and so on. The
claims are empirical—A caused B—but the arguments are usually a
combination of ideological and hypothetical.
Professor Hirschman warned us, however, that notwithstanding the
aesthetic appeal of perversity arguments, we should be on our guard against
them: “[T]he perverse effect is widely appealed to . . . [but] unlikely to exist
‘out there’ to anything like the extent that is claimed.”21 So, with respect to
solitary confinement, I offer this Essay as an appeal for empirical rather than
aesthetic inquiry. Empirically, who has the better of the argument—the
maximalists or the incrementalists? To try to shed some light on how these
issues play out in fact rather than in theory, I examine solitary reform efforts
in two states, Massachusetts and Indiana. In Massachusetts, early
incremental reforms may be providing a blueprint for deeper depopulation
of solitary confinement—though the matter is still highly contested. In
Indiana, incremental reforms seem to be less effective at achieving deeper
depopulation. I explain and offer some hypotheses about the sources of the
difference. In neither state, however, is there any sign of a perverse effect,
where reform actually increases the problem it purports to oppose.
For contextualization of the state-by-state stories, in Part I, I summarize
the nationwide reform litigation efforts in which they have been situated. In
Part II, I provide the case studies of Massachusetts and Indiana. In Part III, I
offer analysis of those case studies.

19
Heather Schoenfeld, Mass Incarceration and the Paradox of Prison Conditions Litigation,
44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 731, 733 (2010).
20
William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 976 (2001) (“Miranda imposes only
the slightest of costs on the police, and its existence may well forestall more serious, and more successful,
regulation of police questioning. . . . Its effects are probably small, perhaps vanishingly so. But what
effects it has are probably perverse—a conclusion that holds, oddly enough, no matter which side of the
left-right divide one is on.”).
21
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 13, at 35.
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I.

NATIONWIDE WAVES OF LITIGATED REFORM
A. Early Challenges to Solitary Confinement

Prisoners’ federal civil rights lawsuits began in earnest22 in the mid1960s,23 and grew quickly in both volume and scope in the 1970s. Federal
judges began by ratifying complaints about in-prison violations of generally
applicable constitutional guarantees (such as the Equal Protection Clause or
the First Amendment)24 but soon started to entertain seriously claims that the
Eighth Amendment’s prescription against “cruel and unusual punishments”
provided a judicially enforceable right to at least minimally adequate prison
conditions. The first such cases involved prison discipline—corporal
punishment and conditions in disciplinary isolation—presumably because
these were easiest to conceptualize as “punishment” separable from the
sentence of incarceration.25
In 1966, for example, after what may have been the first civil rights
prison conditions trial, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
22

There were cases prior to the 1960s, but rarely. And among the earliest U.S. prisoners’ rights
litigation were cases attacking torturous solitary conditions—for example, stress-position restraints. See
In re Birdsong, in which Federal District Judge Emory Speer held that a federal prisoner’s Eighth
Amendment rights had been violated by a county jailer who fed him just bread and water for a maximum
period of three days and chained him “in solitude” by the neck to a grate in his cell at night “so that he
could not put his heels to the ground.” 39 F. 599, 601–03 (S.D. Ga. 1889).
23
I have previously described the erosion of barriers to such litigation from the 1940s through the
1960s. Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REV.
357, 368 (2018); see also Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 548–49 (1941) (barring official censorship
practices that prevented prisoners’ petitions from even arriving at federal courthouses); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 171–87 (1961) (reviving 42 U.S.C. § 1983, providing prisoner plaintiffs a jurisdictional
path into federal court); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667–68 (1962) (holding the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” applicable to states and local
governments); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (reversing categorical exclusion of prisoners
from enforcement of Bill of Rights protection).
24
See, e.g., Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1961) (“[W]e feel constrained to hold . . .
that the present complaints, with their charges of religious persecution, state a claim under the Civil Rights
Act which the district court should entertain.”); Cooper, 378 U.S. at 546; Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d
906, 908 (2d Cir. 1964) (“To the extent that it is a religion those who profess to follow its teaching have
some measure of constitutional protection, even though they are confined to prison and are subject to
prison discipline.”), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
25
See, e.g., Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 684 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (finding that conditions in
isolation constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 521–26 (2d Cir.
1967) (finding the harsh conditions to which the prisoner was subjected constituted cruel and unusual
punishment); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579–81 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding whipping of prisoners
unconstitutional); see also Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 378–79 (D.D.C. 1962) (holding
confinement in “control cell” for prison rule violations unconstitutional because disproportionate to
offense); cf. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1031–34 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.) (discussing scope of
the application of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments to prison
conditions).
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California issued an order regulating solitary confinement cells—an
important instrument of control in that state’s prison system. The court
enjoined the State to provide “the basic requirements which are essential to
life, and . . . such essential requirements as may be necessary to maintain a
degree of cleanliness compatible with elemental decency in accord with the
standards of a civilized community.”26 In a suit about the isolation unit of
New York’s Clinton State Prison at Dannemora, the Second Circuit quoted
the plaintiff’s description of the strip-cell in which he had been placed:
[T]he said solitary confinement cell wherein plaintiff was placed was dirty,
filthy and unsanitary, without adequate heat and virtually barren; the toilet and
sink were encrusted with slime, dirt and human excremental residue
superimposed thereon; plaintiff was without clothing and entirely nude for
several days [elsewhere said to be 11 days] until he was given a thin pair of
underwear to put on; plaintiff was unable to keep himself clean or perform
normal hygienic functions as he was denied the use of soap, towel, toilet paper,
tooth brush, comb, and other hygienic implements and utensils therefore;
plaintiff was compelled under threat of violence, assault or other increased
punishments to remain standing at military attention in front of his cell door
each time an officer appeared from 7:30 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. every day, and he
was not permitted to sleep during the said hours under the pain and threat of
being beaten or otherwise disciplined therefore; the windows in front of his
confinement cell were opened wide throughout the evening and night hours of
each day during subfreezing temperatures causing plaintiff to be exposed to the
cold air and winter weather without clothing or other means of protecting
himself or to escape the detrimental effects thereof; and the said solitary
confinement cell was used as a means of subjecting plaintiff to oppression,
excessively harsh, cruel and inhuman treatment specifically forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 27

The court held that such conditions would violate the Eighth Amendment.28
While many other contemporaneous court decisions rejected similar
lawsuits,29 among the most influential of the early cases was Gates v.
26
Jordan, 257 F. Supp. at 683; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Jordan v. Fitzharris, No. 44786
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1965), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-00080005.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y6D-ZARE]; Resubmission for Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Jordan
v. Fitzharris, No. 43983 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1965), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/
public/PC-CA-0008-0004.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX3Z-9MLZ]. Plaintiff’s counsel, Charles Cohler, had
been appointed by the court and pursued a legal theory that had been pleaded by his client, Robert Charles
Jordan, Jr., a prolific and accomplished writ-writer. Telephone Interview with Charles B. Cohler (Mar.
16, 1999).
27
Wright, 387 F.2d at 521 (alterations in original).
28
Id. at 525.
29
See, for example, Sostre, 442 F.2d at 191–94, and cases cited therein.
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Collier,30 a broad-gauge reform litigation that successfully challenged race
segregation and conditions at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, known as
Parchman Farm.31 In Gates, the district court enjoined all forms of corporal
punishment, including “[b]eating,” “[s]hooting,” “[a]dministering milk of
magnesia” (a laxative), “[t]urning fans on inmates while they are naked and
wet,” and “[u]sing a cattle prod.”32 The court also regulated solitary
confinement:
Defendants, and persons in privity with them, are further enjoined from
confining any inmate in disciplinary segregation or isolation at MSU or
elsewhere, including “dark hole” cells, except under the following conditions:
(a) The inmates so confined shall receive the same daily ration of food which is
provided to the general prison population, and in no event shall such inmates
receive less than 2000 calories per day;
(b) The inmates shall be permitted to wear normal institutional clothing unless
the prison physician orders otherwise for a particular inmate;
(c) The inmates so confined shall be supplied with soap, towels, toothbrush and
shaving utensils;
(d) All disciplinary cells shall be equipped with adequate bedding, including
mattresses, clean sheets and blankets. Adequate bedding may be withheld only
if an inmate misuses or destroys such supplies;
(e) All disciplinary cells shall be adequately heated, ventilated and maintained
in a sanitary condition at all times;
(f) No inmate shall be confined in any isolation cell referred to as a dark hole
for a period in excess of 24 hours.33

As prison conditions cases multiplied, this type of order became fairly
typical. Professor Keramet Reiter summarizes the case law as of the 1980s:
[I]mprovements to isolation conditions . . . were ordered again and again by
courts across the country . . . . [and included]: (l) requirements that prisoners
have access to some basic routines of daily life, like showers and regular
outdoor exercise; (2) requirements that prisoners have minimum physical
comforts, largely geared toward avoiding health problems, such as provisions
for adequate lighting as well as adequate hygiene, and limitations on noise; (3)
requirements that prisoners be physically safe from attacks by other prisoners,

30

349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff’d, 501 F.2d. 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 885, 895; see also DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND
THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 241–48 (1996).
32
349 F. Supp. at 900.
33
Id.
31
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and relatedly, not be isolated in overcrowded cells; (4) requirements that
prisoners have some minimal due process protections.34

B. Limited Supermax Challenges
The current U.S. solitary confinement regime was inaugurated in the
early 1980s by the Marion lockdown, a response by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons to the murder of two correctional officers on the same day in 1983
at the U.S. Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois.35 Modern solitary confinement
converted the example set by the lockdown into long-term, high-security
“supermaxes,”36 which became very fashionable, proliferating rapidly.
Litigation followed almost immediately. It necessarily looked somewhat
different than prior litigation had. As Professor Reiter generalizes (perhaps
a bit overgeneralizes):
In a sense, supermax prisons represent the opposite of the many abuses courts
documented in the 1970s and 1980s prison reform cases. The supermax prison
keeps people in absolute isolation; no overcrowding. The supermax prison is
brand new—made of clean steel and smooth concrete, with technologically
advanced central control rooms, from which officers can open and close cell
doors at the push of a button without even the necessity of human sound, let
alone contact; no dilapidation, no filth. Heavy doors with perfect seals muffle
the sounds; no intolerable din. Supermax prisons keep individual prisoners
contained, each in his own concrete box, for 23–24 h[ours] every day; no
violence.37

That is, the supermax prisons built in the 1980s often complied with the
case law of the 1970s and were thus somewhat litigation resistant. And the
lower federal courts—pushed to the right by President Reagan’s, and
eventually President George H. W. Bush’s, nominees38 and by the new
Rehnquist Court—were growing more reluctant to recognize new rights,
even in response to new institutional practices.

34
Keramet Ann Reiter, The Most Restrictive Alternative: A Litigation History of Solitary
Confinement in U.S. Prisons, 1960–2006, 57 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 71, 103 (2012) [hereinafter Reiter,
The Most Restrictive Alternative].
35
See AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., THE LESSONS OF MARION: THE FAILURE OF A MAXIMUM
SECURITY PRISON: A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, WITH VOICES OF PRISONERS 1 (1985),
https://www.afsc.org/document/lessons-marion [https://perma.cc/ZPV5-3P38].
36
RIVELAND, supra note 2, at 1, 5–6.
37
Reiter, The Most Restrictive Alternative, supra note 34, at 106.
38
For a discussion of the existence and magnitude of the rightward shift, and supporting sources, see
Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 595–96 (2006) [hereinafter Schlanger, Injunctions over Time].
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Less than a year after the Marion lockdown, a class action challenged
Marion’s resultant harsh conditions of confinement under the Eighth
Amendment. In 1988, the Seventh Circuit rejected that challenge. The
opinion in Bruscino v. Carlson, by Judge Richard Posner, described
conditions as “sordid and horrible,” but found them necessitated by
security.39 The court noted, “If order could be maintained in Marion without
resort to the harsh methods attacked in this lawsuit, the plaintiffs would have
a stronger argument that the methods were indeed cruel and unusual
punishments. But the plaintiffs’ able counsel have no suggestions as to how
this might be done.”40
The most significant attack on supermax-type confinement that
followed was Madrid v. Gomez, a class action challenging conditions of
confinement at Pelican Bay, a supermax in the far northwest corner of
California, in rural Del Norte County.41 Filed in 1990 and litigated in front
of one of the most progressive members of the federal bench, Judge Thelton
Henderson,42 the eventual ruling in Madrid rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt at
wholesale reform. In a tremendously detailed and influential 139-page
opinion issued in 1995, Judge Henderson found that prison staff habitually
used excessive force against inmates in a variety of situations; that the
medical and mental health care at Pelican Bay were constitutionally
inadequate; and that conditions in the Secure Housing Unit (SHU)
constituted cruel and unusual punishment for prisoners with mental illness,
brain damage, intellectual disabilities, or borderline personality disorders.43
But for prisoners not in those “specific population subgroups,” he ruled,
“[c]onditions in the SHU may well hover on the edge of what is humanly
tolerable for those with normal resilience, particularly when endured for
extended periods of time. They do not, however, violate exacting Eighth
Amendment standards.”44

39

854 F.2d 162, 164–165 (7th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 165–66; see also Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 621–22 (7th Cir. 1973) (describing the
origin of the Marion control unit as a response to prison work stoppages); Jules Lobel, Mass Solitary and
Mass Incarceration: Explaining the Dramatic Rise in Prolonged Solitary in America’s Prisons, 115 NW.
U. L. REV. 159 (2020).
41
889 F. Supp. 1146, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
42
SOUL OF JUSTICE: THELTON HENDERSON’S AMERICAN JOURNEY (California Newsreel 2005),
http://newsreel.org/video/SOUL-OF-JUSTICE-THELTON-HENDERSON
[https://perma.cc/6KK8QSSK].
43
Madrid, 889 F. Supp at 1236, 1251, 1258, 1280.
44
Id. at 1280.
40
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Madrid set the terms of the next two decades of litigated solitary
confinement advocacy.45 It had well-resourced and expert plaintiffs’ counsel
in front of the most favorable judge they could hope for. Their target, Pelican
Bay, had the starkest conditions of any supermax prison in the country.46 If
they could not win a ruling that such conditions were categorically
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, it seemed implausible that anyone else could win a
similar ruling. And so the prisoners’ rights bar moved on, falling back to two
more limited types of challenges. First, in cases brought under the Due
Process Clause, plaintiffs argued that more procedure was required to
consign a prisoner to solitary confinement. And second, Eighth Amendment
cases followed the path Judge Henderson had laid out, focusing on special
populations—groups of prisoners particularly prone to grievous suffering in
solitary.
Supreme Court case law closely constrained the first strategy. In 1995,
Sandin v. Conner held that the Due Process Clause did not even apply to
most assignments of prisoners to solitary confinement because “segregated
confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in
which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.”47 Solitary
confinement challenges under the Due Process Clause thus had to
demonstrate first that the regime they challenged was materially different
from the conditions presented in Sandin based on the term or the conditions
of confinement. A number of cases pursued this approach.
The doctrinal results were not, however, terribly impressive. In 2005,
in Wilkinson v. Austin, the Supreme Court agreed with the prisoner-plaintiffs
that prisoners did indeed have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
avoiding long-term supermax.48 That said, Austin shrank the litigation benefit
of such a finding, ratifying bare-bones notice and meager hearing rights. In
an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court unanimously rejected the
lower court’s insistence that: a prisoner under consideration for supermax
classification be provided with “an exhaustive list of grounds believed to
justify [the] placement” and a summary of the evidence against him;
prisoners be allowed to present documentary evidence and call witnesses to
challenge the placement; the state’s classification authority summarize the

45

For analysis of Madrid’s impact on prison litigation norms more generally, see Schlanger,
Injunctions over Time, supra note 38, at 618–21.
46
See KERAMET REITER, 23/7: PELICAN BAY PRISON AND THE RISE OF LONG-TERM SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT 19–29 (2016).
47
515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995).
48
545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005).
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evidence supporting its recommendation; and the state “advise the inmate
what specific conduct is necessary for that prisoner to be reduced from Level
5 and the amount of time it will take before [Ohio] reduce[s] the inmate’s
security level classification.”49 Austin’s holding meant that procedural
obstacles would pose little challenge to any state committed to solitary
confinement for even a large fraction of its prisoners. This low impact was
not inherent in the procedural strategy: prior to the Supreme Court’s
intervention, the Austin litigation itself led to the release of over 80% of the
prisoners in Ohio supermax confinement.50 But the Court’s weak version of
procedural due process would not have compelled this result.
The second post-Madrid strategy, the special-populations approach,
made more difference than the first. Some prisoners, Judge Henderson had
written, are especially vulnerable to severe damage from solitary
confinement. For them,
the record demonstrates . . . a particularly high risk for suffering very serious or
severe injury to their mental health, including overt paranoia, psychotic breaks
with reality, or massive exacerbations of existing mental illness as a result of
the conditions in the SHU. Such inmates consist of the already mentally ill, as
well as persons with borderline personality disorders, brain damage or mental
retardation, impulse-ridden personalities, or a history of prior psychiatric
problems or chronic depression. For these inmates, placing them in the SHU is
the mental equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to
breathe . . . . Such inmates are not required to endure the horrific suffering of a
serious mental illness or major exacerbation of an existing mental illness before
obtaining relief.51

And so, cases were filed on behalf of—especially—prisoners with
mental illness. In several states, the result was a settlement barring at least
prisoners with serious mental illness, especially psychosis, from solitary
confinement.52 Such settlements could reach a significant portion of solitary
prisoners. (As with all settlements, the details and monitoring mattered.
Without close implementation oversight, these kinds of settlements

49

Id. at 219–20 (alterations in original) (quoting Wilkinson v. Austin, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1028
(N.D. Ohio 2012)).
50
E-mail from Jules Lobel, Supreme Court counsel of record, Wilkinson v. Austin, to author (Feb.
16, 2020, 22:49 EST) (on file with journal).
51
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265–66 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
52
See, e.g., Private Settlement Agreement at 2–3, Disability Advocates Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of
Mental Health, No. 02-cv-4002 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2007), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/PC-NY-0048-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NX5-S5NQ]; Settlement Agreement at 6,
Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07-10463 (D. Mass. Dec. 12, 2011), available at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-0026-0004.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DFE-99GT].
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promoted miraculous cures of long-diagnosed psychosis; with the diagnosis
withdrawn, the prisoner remained eligible for solitary confinement.) And as
scientific evidence of other particular vulnerabilities mounted—for pregnant
women, youthful prisoners, and individuals with particular physical
disabilities, among others—new litigation began to expand exclusions to
these populations as well.53
In the sustained attack on solitary confinement that followed Madrid,
prisoners and prisoners’ rights advocates partnered with sympathetic
corrections administrators and state legislators, who undertook reviews and
reforms that could later be assessed. Their efforts included development of
the scientific record on the harms of solitary and of penological alternatives.
This followed up on Judge Posner’s point in Bruscino that the Eighth
Amendment challenge lost plausibility in the absence of some alternative to
solitary confinement that could solve the grave security threats cited by
correctional authorities.54
C. The Return to Wholesale Challenges
It was more than twenty years after Madrid that prisoner self-advocacy
finally jolted litigation back to a more general set of challenges in two highprofile cases: Ashker v. Brown and Peoples v. Fischer. In Ashker, two
prisoners in California who had been confined in Pelican Bay’s SHU for
decades, Todd Ashker and Danny Troxel, filed several pro se lawsuits
complaining that solitary confinement conditions constituted cruel and
unusual punishment.55 In 2011, they began what became a widespread
hunger strike, attracting thousands of California prisoner participants.56 This
drew the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), a radical advocacy
organization, to join and litigate their case. After Ashker survived a motion
53

See, e.g., Settlement Agreement at 30, Peoples v. Fischer, No. 11-cv-2964 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2016),
available
at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-NY-0062-0015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZA2D-8GFW] (presumption against placing pregnant prisoners in solitary, absent
exceptional circumstances); Settlement Agreement at 5–9, H.C. v. Bradshaw, No. 9:18-cv-80810 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 15, 2018), available at https://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-FL-0023-0005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JE62-JQZP] (limiting the time and use of segregated housing for prisoners under age
eighteen); Harvard v. Inch, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1220, 1231 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s claim that the prison’s use of isolation units against people with physical disabilities
was in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
54
See Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 165–66 (7th Cir. 1988). For a collection of amicus briefs
summarizing the results, see Margo Schlanger, Sheila Bedi, David Shapiro & Lynn Branham, Featured,
Cited,
and
Supplemental
Litigation
Documents,
INCARCERATION
&
L.,
http://incarcerationlaw.com/resources/case-documents/ [https://perma.cc/RH3W-JATD].
55
Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-5796, 2013 WL 1435148, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2013).
56
For Ashker’s account of the events, see Summary: Todd’s Short Bio, TODD ASHKER,
https://toddashker.org/tag/2016/ [https://perma.cc/RL7N-5HAD].
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to dismiss,57 CCR was able to bring the now-developed expert views against
solitary confinement into the record—reports similar to those in Madrid but
now informed by two decades of factual development.58 In addition, the
plaintiffs presented new evidence supporting the claim that social isolation
and deprivation of touch inflict significant harm.59 In 2015, the case settled,
with terms requiring hundreds of prisoners who had been housed in solitary
to be moved to general population—though still high-security—housing.60
And in New York, after several incrementalist lawsuits, a handful of pro se
prisoner complaints were consolidated to become Peoples v. Fischer, a class
action that began what became a path to general reform.61 State-specific
nonlitigation reform efforts have also moved from the incremental to more
general, achieving something close to solitary confinement abolition in
several states.62
Table 1 presents some relevant data on the number of prisoners in
solitary confinement for the full United States, and for Massachusetts and
Indiana, since those are the states discussed in detail below.63

57

Ashker, 2013 WL 1435148, at *1.
For many of the documents filed in Ashker, see Ashker v. Governor of California, CTR. FOR CONST.
RTS.
(May
4,
2020),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/ashker-v-brown
[https://perma.cc/UUD2-VBNH]. For a summary of the litigation, see Ashker v. Brown, C.R. LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12103 [https://perma.cc/DWS2-Z528].
59
See Expert Report of Dr. Dacher Keltner, Ph.D. at 3, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-5796 (N.D. Cal.
Mar.
11,
2015),
available
at
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/Keltner%20Expert%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YW7B-QCEG] (“Human relations, health, and well-being depend critically upon the
quality of touch an individual experiences in everyday social interactions.”); Expert Report of Matthew
D. Lieberman at 4, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-5796 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015), available at
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/Lieberman%20Expert%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24E5-SY7B] (“[A] lack of social connection and social support have been examined as
risk factors for morbidity (i.e. death) . . . . [and] has also been repeatedly associated with various
deleterious mental and physical health consequences . . . .” (citation omitted)).
60
Settlement Agreement, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-5796 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015), available at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0054-0024.pdf [https://perma.cc/6P2F-HFYV].
61
See
Peoples
v.
Fischer,
C.R.
LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12210 [https://perma.cc/G3LY-VNCB]; Interview with
Phillip Desgranges & Alex Reiter, supra note 5.
62
For essays by heads of corrections about their reform efforts in Colorado, Idaho, North Dakota,
and Ohio, see THE ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW AT
YALE LAW SCH., WORKING TO LIMIT RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: EFFORTS IN FOUR JURISDICTIONS TO
MAKE
CHANGES
(2018),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/asca_liman_2018_restrictive_housin
g_efforts_in_four_jurisdictions_to_make_changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AGR-ZWDD].
63
For a full panel of state-by-state data, see this Essay’s online appendix, available at
http://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Pages/Publications.aspx [https://perma.cc/FN3
J-UNEP].
58
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TABLE 1: PRISON SOLITARY CONFINEMENT BY STATE64

Source
Bureau of
Justice
Statistics
ASCA–
Liman
Report
Bureau of
Justice
Statistics
ASCA–
Liman
Report
MDOC
Bureau of
Justice
Statistics
ASCA–
Liman
Report

Year

Total Prison
Population

1990
1995
2000
2005
2014
2015
2017

12,338
14,044
18,195
23,205
28,318
27,508
26,317

1990
1995
2000
2005
2014
2015
2017
2020

7,870
10,579
10,500
10,262
10,475
10,004
9,047
7,941

1990
1995
2000
2005
2014*
2015*
2017*
2017 (est.)

690,771
990,617
1,305,253
1,427,316
1,049,984
1,124,695
1,055,196
1,490,000

Indiana

Solitary Confinement
Prisoners
% Population
602
697
1,348
1,014
1,789
1,621
1,741

4.9%
5.0%
7.4%
4.4%
6.3%
5.9%
6.6%

417
515
542
313
518
235
443
299

5.3%
4.9%
5.2%
3.1%
5.5%
2.3%
4.9%
3.8%

36,254
47,945
70,085
63,885
66,495
56,337
46,893
61,000

5.2%
4.8%
5.4%
4.5%
6.3%
5.0%
4.4%
4.1%

Massachusetts

United States

*Survey responders only.65

64
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ICPSR 24642, CENSUS OF STATE AND
FEDERAL
ADULT
CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES,
2005
(2017)
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/24642 [https://perma.cc/V6ZH-AGMQ]; U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ICPSR 4021, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
ADULT
CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES,
2000
(2004),
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/4021 [https://perma.cc/G837-JYEA]; U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ICPSR 6953, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL ADULT
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995 (1998), https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6953
[https://perma.cc/J4TS-87DX]; THE ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEREST LAW AT YALE LAW SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-LIMAN
NATIONWIDE
SURVEY
OF
TIME-IN-CELL
12–13
(2018),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/asca_liman_2018_restrictive_housin
g_released_oct_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U7L-HTWN] [hereinafter ASCA & LIMAN, 2018]; ASS’N
OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE LIMAN PROGRAM, YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE ASCA-LIMAN
2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 15 (2015),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/time-in-cell_combined_web_august_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY3G-YPG9] [hereinafter ASCA & LIMAN, 2015]; MASS. DEP’T
OF CORR., MONTHLY RESTRICTIVE HOUSING REPORT (2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc/restrictivehousing-report-march-2020/download [https://perma.cc/9RJK-KPC7]; MASS. DEP’T OF CORR., WEEKLY
COUNT SHEET 1 (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc/weekly-inmate-count-322020/download
[https://perma.cc/C5PC-77XN]. Note that Table 1 should be read as suggestive only—in particular, there
is reason to think that the Bureau of Justice Statistics results from 1995 to 2005 do not measure precisely
the same thing as the ASCA–Liman results from 2014 to 2017. Total U.S. prison population in 2017 is
from JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 252156, PRISONERS
IN 2017 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [https://perma.cc/55E2-ZUTJ].
65
For the 2014 results, survey responders include thirty-four jurisdictions, housing about 73% of the
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Table 1 presents data from two different series of publications (labeled
by source in its first column). Data should be compared only within source
type; the apparent increase in solitary from 2005 to 2014 may be a function
of methodological differences, rather than reflecting a true increase. Even
conservatively interpreted, however, it demonstrates that a long path remains
to solitary confinement abolition. On any given day, U.S. prisons house over
60,000 people in solitary confinement.66 And so the question remains: are
incrementalist strategies helpful or harmful to the abolitionist goal?
II. TWO STATE CASE STUDIES
I have picked two states, Massachusetts and Indiana, as sites for a
deeper dive into the pathways of solitary reform. This is a compare-andcontrast exercise: the two states are similar in some ways and different in
others. In both, incrementalist strategies dominated for several decades. But
more recently, Massachusetts seems to be heading towards more general and
deeper reductions in solitary populations, while Indiana does not. Between
the two, it is possible to examine most of the current reform approaches.
A. Massachusetts
Solitary reform came early to Massachusetts in 1985, when prisoners at
the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction mailed a letter
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court describing dangerous
conditions in the Disciplinary Segregation Unit (DSU).67 Justice Paul Liacos
treated the letter as a court complaint, asked Massachusetts Correctional
Legal Services to represent the prisoners, and took original jurisdiction over
the matter.68 The resulting litigation, Hoffer v. Fair,69 challenged the
procedures by which prisoners were placed and held in administrative
segregation under Massachusetts’s constitution, state statutes, and
regulations, as well as privileges and programming. The plaintiffs won and

American prison population. ASCA & LIMAN, 2015, supra note 64, at 2. The 2015 and 2017 results are
for forty jurisdictions. ASCA & LIMAN, 2018, supra note 64, at 96 tbl.21.
66
See id. at 4. There are no reliable estimates for jails, but if the solitary rate is similar in jail and
prison, that would add another 33,000 to the count.
67
The Supreme Judicial Court had rejected a challenge to conditions at the unit just a few years prior
in Libby v. Commissioner of Correction, 432 N.E.2d 486 (Mass. 1982).
68
See Hoffer v. Comm’r of Corr., 490 N.E.2d 417, 418–19 (Mass. 1986); E-mail from James
Pingeon, Litig. Dir., Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of Mass., to author (Oct. 28, 2019, 13:55 EST) (on file with
journal).
69
For a description of the litigation, see Hoffer v. Fair, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10038 [https://perma.cc/J4EQ-2LJQ].
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Justice Liacos ordered significant changes to the regulations that governed
the unit.70
For prisoners who ended up in the DSU, the intervention was limited;
even after the reforms, DSU prisoners spent twenty-three hours per day in
their cells (though the regulations did improve their access to reading
material and visitation and required individualized justification for
programming restrictions). The more important limit was on who could be
sent to the unit and for how long. The regulatory changes were primarily
intended “to ensure that residents will not be unnecessarily or arbitrarily
retained in the DSU.”71 The regulations, currently still in effect, have
provided for a hearing before an impartial board, which can impose solitary
confinement only based on “substantial evidence” that the prisoner poses a
“substantial threat” to the safety of himself, others, or the operation of the
facility.72 Perhaps more significantly, in practice, the regulations have
required solitary confinement to be conditional. That is, the state has had to
set conditions with which compliance would lead to release from solitary in
six months. These conditions could include, for example, “successful
participation in specified counseling or evaluation programs, [the]
completion of work assignments, remaining free of disciplinary reports,
cooperation with correctional personnel, and maintenance of cell and
sanitation standards.”73
Decades of litigation flowed from these regulations. In 1995, the state
attempted to repeal the regulations, but that effort was enjoined.74 Then, in
the early 2000s, as procedural due process challenges made only limited
headway under federal law,75 Massachusetts prisoners’ rights advocates
sought—eventually successfully—to have the regulations applied more
broadly to other prisons and to similar, though not identical, solitary

70
Hoffer v. Fair, No. 85-71, slip op. at 39–51 (Mass. Mar. 3, 1988), available at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-0029-0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/67F8-JV5X].
The modified DSU regulations issued in response to that decision were codified at 103 M ASS. CODE
REGS. 421.00, 421.20(2)(c), 421.20(7) (since modified).
71
Hoffer v. Comm’r of Corr., 589 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (Mass. 1992).
72
103 MASS. CODE REGS. 421.09, 421.12 (2020).
73
103 MASS. CODE REGS. 421.15 (2020).
74
See Post Final Judgment Order, Hoffer v. Fair, No. SJ-1985-0071 (Mass. Sept. 26, 1995), available
at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-0029-9000.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8M6SKST].
75
See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 230 (2005); Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995);
supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
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confinement settings.76 This led to the shutdown of several such units.77
However, in the meantime, the Department of Correction (DOC) has
managed to reduce the regulations’ impact by reconfiguring its solitary
system, substituting long-term disciplinary segregation for much of the
confinement previously accomplished by administrative segregation.78 That
change wiped out the impact of the 1980s reforms; Massachusetts
disciplinary rules imposed solitary confinement as a sanction for in-prison
misconduct for up to ten years per offense.79 And a litigated challenge to
solitary imposed as a disciplinary sanction failed completely.80
A different incrementalist lawsuit was filed in 2007 by a consortium of
Massachusetts lawyers: Massachusetts Correctional Legal Services
(renamed Prisoners Legal Services of Massachusetts during the lawsuit’s
pendency); the Center for Public Representation, a disability rights
organization; the Disability Law Center (DLC), which served as both lawyer
and organizational plaintiff; and a large white-shoe law firm, Bingham
McCutchen. The case, Disability Law Center v. Massachusetts Department
of Correction,81 focused on prisoners with mental illnesses, alleging
violations of the Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act:
By placing prisoners with mental illnesses in segregated confinement, the
Massachusetts Department of Correction subjects these vulnerable individuals
to conditions they are physically and psychologically incapable of tolerating for
any sustained period of time. The extreme social isolation and sensory
deprivation conditions of segregated confinement are difficult for all prisoners;
76

See Cantell v. Comm’r of Corr., 60 N.E.3d 1149, 1151 (Mass. 2016) (described at Cantell v.
Commissioner
of
Correction
et
al.,
C.R.
LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17279 [https://perma.cc/QPD9-PJKT]) (applying DSU
regulations to other units in which conditions “are also at least as restrictive as those applied to [DSUs]”);
LaChance v. Comm’r of Corr., 978 N.E.2d 1199, 1205 (Mass. 2012) (described at LaChance v.
Commissioner, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17282
[https://perma.cc/T4VX-RSND]) (finding that “under DOC regulations, indefinite confinement in any
unit where conditions are substantially similar to those of a DSU entitles an inmate to the protections
afforded by the DSU regulations”); Haverty v. Comm’r of Corr., 776 N.E.2d 973, 991 (Mass. 2002)
(described at Haverty v. Commissioner of Correction, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10037 [https://perma.cc/Q9AX-PEP7]) (finding non-DSU
segregation units to be so similar to those of the DSU that state regulations apply).
77
E-mail from James R. Pingeon, Litig. Dir., Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of Mass., to author (Mar. 31,
2020, 13:32 EST) (on file with journal).
78
Id.; see also E-mail from James R. Pingeon, supra note 68.
79
103 MASS. CODE REGS. 430.25(1)(f) (2020); see also E-mail from James R. Pingeon, supra note
68.
80
Torres v. Comm’r of Corr., 695 N.E.2d 200, 206 (Mass. 1998).
81
No. 1:07-cv-10463-MLW (D. Mass.). For a case description, see Disability Law Center v.
Massachusetts
Department
of
Correction,
C.R.
LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9481 [https://perma.cc/42Y9-3R9K].
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for prisoners with mental illnesses, they exceed the limit of human endurance.
Indeed, it is only too common for prisoners with mental illnesses to suffer
further psychological deterioration, inflict serious harm to themselves, and even
commit suicide as a result of placement in segregation. 82

Five years of litigation resulted in a settlement agreement largely
excluding prisoners with serious mental illness from both disciplinary and
administrative segregation. Instead, such prisoners were to be housed, if
possible, in a “Secure Treatment Unit,” designed to be more therapeutic.
There were two types of such units: “Secure Treatment Program” units for
prisoners with Axis I (that is, psychosis and mood disorder) diagnoses and
“Behavioral Management Units” for those with Axis II (personality disorder)
diagnoses.83 While waiting for this assignment, covered prisoners were to be
provided more out-of-cell time and slightly more privileges.84 The settlement
implementation period was three years, and the case was dismissed in 2015.85
Observers report that the Secure Treatment Program (STP) units are notably
different from pre-reform solitary confinement, with a much more
therapeutic environment, but that the Behavioral Management Units (BMUs)
remain highly punitive. A DOC presentation slide86 from early in the new
regime confirms the point. Titled “Different Issues = Different
Interventions,” it contrasts the two types of units:
Mentally Ill
o Medication
o Supportive Therapy
o Insight into mental illness
o Relationships with staff and
other offenders are important

Antisocial/Psychopathic
o Behavior Management
o Clearly defined incentives and
consequences
o Strict adherence to rules
o All staff must be consistent

82
Complaint at 1, Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:07-cv-10463-MLW (D. Mass.
Mar. 8, 2017), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-0026-0001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BM9X-269T].
83
Presentation, Katherine L. O’Neill, Dir. of Behavioral Health, Specialized Mental Health Units:
Massachusetts Department of Correction (no date but covers period through 2011) (on file with journal).
84
Settlement Agreement at 3–7, Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:07-cv-10463MLW (D. Mass. Dec. 12, 2011), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA0026-0004.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS5E-Z99P].
85
Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:07-cv-10463MLW (D. Mass. May 20, 2015), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA0026-0009.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QTL-SGBA].
86
O’Neill, supra note 83.
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A 2012 report by plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Kathryn Burns demonstrates that the
BMUs were experienced by prisoners to be no less punitive than
presettlement solitary. Dr. Burns reported a high “degree of anger, hostility
and frustration expressed by the inmates,” who complained that BMU
programming was “punitive rather than therapeutic,” and reported overuse
of “accountability cells”—a cell assignment attached to “loss of
level/privileges and property; removal of clothing and undergarments with
issue of safety smock; no soap or toothpaste; no access to shower; and all
meals are finger foods.”87 Bob Fleischner, plaintiffs’ counsel in Disability
Law Center and also a member of a current oversight committee, reports
more recently that prisoners with serious mental illness describe the STP
units as “life saving.” Fleischner says he has observed a sharp shift in
attitude, as staff have come around to the view that prisoners with serious
mental illness do not belong in solitary. By contrast, he sees the Behavioral
Management Units as highly punitive, and reports that the prisoners housed
there are extremely unhappy.88
In addition, prisoners’ rights lawyer Jim Pingeon reports that the DLC
case improved the environment for those prisoners left in solitary. The
disciplinary units, he says,
became notably calmer and less chaotic with the removal of prisoners with SMI.
Before, when I’d go onto the unit there were almost always people screaming;
it was often filled with smoke from prisoners lighting fires, and the smell of
feces from prisoners throwing it out of their cells or smearing it in the showers
was often in the air. The difference post DLC-suit was palpable and even guards
expressed appreciation.89

Thus, as of 2015, incremental solitary confinement reform in
Massachusetts had produced moderate payoffs: hard-won procedural
requirements for administrative segregation covered only a portion of the
prisoners facing solitary confinement and had even provoked the backlash
of long-term disciplinary segregation. And true alternatives to solitary were
being implemented for just a small portion of the affected population.
Conditions in solitary were a bit improved.
But in the years since, it has seemed that both the procedural and
substantive steps just described are providing a crucial blueprint for much
more thoroughgoing reforms. First, as the Disability Law Center case drew
87
First Report of Designated Expert Kathryn A. Burns, MD, MPH at 4, Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass.
Dep’t
of
Corr.,
No.
1:07-cv-10463-MLW
(Oct.
22,
2012),
available
at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-0026-0016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UKS-EC3U].
88
Telephone Interview with Robert Fleischner, supra note 5.
89
E-mail from James R. Pingeon, supra note 68.
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to its close in 2015, the legislature passed a statute largely codifying the
settlement, rendering it permanent.90 The statute provided:
Except in exigent circumstances that would create an unacceptable risk to the
safety of any person or where no secure treatment unit bed is available, a
segregated inmate diagnosed with a serious mental illness in accordance with
clinical standards adopted by the department of correction shall not be housed
in a segregated unit for more than 30 days and shall be placed in a secure
treatment unit. Any such segregated inmate awaiting transfer to a secure
treatment unit shall be offered additional mental health services in accordance
with clinical standards adopted by the department. 91

Next, in 2018, much more thorough reform began. Solitary confinement
reform was made a small part of a comprehensive criminal justice reform
effort, signed by the Governor in April and effective December 31, 2018.92
The new statute’s reach is far broader than any of the prior interventions,
though it used them as a model. Massachusetts criminal justice reform had a
broad constituency—activists of many stripes exerted political pressure, and
legislative leaders and their allies worked on the issue in state government,
pressuring a reluctant governor.93
First, building on the Disability Law Center reforms, the new statute
expanded the definition of “serious mental illness” to include:
(i) schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders; (ii) major depressive disorders;
(iii) all types of bipolar disorders; (iv) a neurodevelopmental disorder, dementia
or other cognitive disorder; (v) any disorder commonly characterized by breaks
with reality or perceptions of reality; (vi) all types of anxiety disorders; (vii)
trauma and stressor related disorders; or (viii) severe personality disorders; or a
finding by a qualified mental health professional that the prisoner is at serious
risk of substantially deteriorating mentally or emotionally while confined in
restrictive housing, or already has so deteriorated while confined in restrictive
housing, such that diversion or removal is deemed to be clinically appropriate
by a qualified mental health professional.94

90

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, §§ 1, 39, 39A (2015) (all now amended).
Id. § 39A(b) (effective Apr. 5, 2015 to Dec. 30, 2018).
92
S. 2371, 189th Gen. Court. §§ 85–86 (Mass. 2018) (amending M ASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 1 by
adding a new definition of restrictive housing and expanding the definition of SMI); id. § 93 (amending
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39 by striking § 39 and § 39A and adding new sections).
93
See Matt Murphy, Negotiators File Compromise Criminal Justice Reform Bill, METROWEST
DAILY
NEWS
(Mar.
26,
2018,
2:24
PM),
https://www.metrowestdailynews.com/news/20180323/negotiators-file-compromise-criminal-justicereform-bill [perma.cc/8LGV-YAA4].
94
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 1 (2020).
91
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This definition covers many more people than the lawsuit settlement. And
the new statute imposes a more muscular ban on solitary confinement of this
larger group. It bars prisoners with serious mental illness, so defined, from
restrictive housing absent certification provided to the prisoner explaining
(i) the reason why the prisoner may not be safely held in the general population;
(ii) that there is no available placement in a secure treatment unit; (iii) that
efforts are being undertaken to find appropriate housing and the status of the
efforts; and (iv) the anticipated time frame for resolution. 95

In addition, the new statute goes further in the special-populations
direction in several ways. It applies to jails as well as prisons.96 The results
have been mixed. As James Pingeon reports, “Some [jails] have responded
by increasing out-of-cell time to a bit more than two hours so the[] law won’t
apply, but others have made pretty significant strides in reducing the solitary
population and creating alternative treatment units.”97 It imposes a flat ban
on housing pregnant prisoners in restrictive housing.98 And it requires that
“[t]he fact that a prisoner is lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or
intersex or has a gender identity or expression or sexual orientation
uncommon in general population shall not be grounds for placement in
restrictive housing.”99
The rest of the new statute covers everyone in solitary confinement, not
just special populations. Besides softening the conditions in solitary in a
variety of ways, it allows isolation of prisoners only if they “pose[] an
unacceptable risk: (i) to the safety of others; (ii) of damage or destruction of
property; or (iii) to the operation of a correctional facility,”100 and it enforces
that requirement via “placement reviews.”101 The effect is to eliminate longfixed-term solitary confinement as a disciplinary sanction. It also sets up
oversight mechanisms, including a “restrictive housing oversight
committee,” which includes DOC personnel, other law enforcement, and
outsiders connected to the two litigation efforts described above or otherwise
likely to have a more prisoner-friendly orientation (“the executive director
of Disability Law Center, Inc. or a designee, . . . the executive director of
Prisoners’ Legal Services or a designee, . . . the executive director of the
95

Id. § 39A(a).
Id. § 39(a) (governing “the superintendent of a state correctional facility or the administrator of a
county correctional facility”).
97
E-mail from James R. Pingeon, supra note 68.
98
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39A(d) (2020).
99
Id. § 39A(c).
100
Id. § 39(a).
101
Id. § 39B(a).
96
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Massachusetts Association for Mental Health, Inc. or a designee and . . . a
licensed social worker designated by the Massachusetts chapter of the
National Association of Social Workers, Inc.”).102 Thus, to quote James
Pingeon, incrementalist litigation has “to some extent . . . work[ed] in
harmony” with closer-to-abolitionist legislation.103 The litigation put
“pressure . . . on the governor,” leading to progress via political rather than
court-centered routes.104
Implementation of this set of reforms is, however, hotly contested. Even
though he had signed the new statute, Governor Charlie Baker soon proposed
to dial back the definition of serious mental illness.105 Although his proposal
died with the legislative session in which it was introduced, it was revived
the following session and is currently pending.106 Meanwhile, the state first
delayed the designation of the oversight committee,107 then promulgated a
temporary regulation that banned committee members’ communication to
the public or the press (absent approval of the chair); limited informationgathering to existing documents and data; and barred unannounced visits to
prisons and all access to nonpublic data (such as prisoner files) without a
signed prisoner release.108 In August 2019, the final regulation backed off on
what the press had labeled a “gag rule” but maintained the other limits.109
The Department of Correction also implemented new “Secure Adjustment
Units” that, while locking prisoners down in single cells for nearly all of each
day, allow them sufficient out-of-cell hours per day to escape classification
102

Id. § 39G(a).
Telephone Interview with James Pingeon, supra note 5.
104
Id.
105
Letter from Charles D. Baker, Governor of Mass., to the Mass. Senate & House of
Representatives
(Apr.
13,
2018),
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/04/13/CJ%20Supplement%20Filing%20Letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4CGP-LK3Q] (“[T]he Act’s definition of serious mental illness is so broad that it
includes any inmate with an anxiety disorder, no matter how well managed with medication, and trauma
and stressor related disorders. The enclosed bill includes a more narrow definition of ‘serious mental
illness’ that, when appropriate, incorporates the concept of significant functional impairment.”).
106
See An Act Clarifying the Definition of Serious Mental Illness on Criminal Justice Reform, H.
1571, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019) (pending); An Act Building on Criminal Justice Reform, H. 4426,
190th Gen. Court (Mass. 2018).
107
See Telephone Interview with Robert Fleischner, supra note 5.
108
See 103 MASS. CODE REGS. 179.00 (2019).
109
Compare id., with PRISONERS’ LEGAL SERVS. OF MASS., TESTIMONY OF DESIGNEES TO THE
RESTRICTIVE HOUSING OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS’ PROPOSED
REGULATIONS 103 CMR 179 REGARDING THE RESTRICTIVE HOUSING OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE (2019),
https://www.mamh.org/assets/files/RHOC-Testimony-re-Regs.docx
[https://perma.cc/W72P-JQ8U]
(testimony of Marlene Sallo, on behalf of the Disability Law Center; Robert Fleischner, on behalf of the
Massachusetts Association for Mental Health; and Bonita Tenneriello, on behalf of Prisoners’ Legal
Services of Massachusetts; National Association of Social Workers, Massachusetts Chapter).
103
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as solitary confinement under the new statute.110 In response, reformers have
introduced tighter statutory language, which is under consideration in the
state legislature.111
There is no way to know where all this will land—it is clear that the
Governor and Department of Correction are resisting reform, but unclear
who will finally win the tug-of-war. Currently (prior to COVID-19 issues),
the monthly population in solitary confinement in Massachusetts prisons has
declined, but certainly not to zero. In the first month for which data were
collected under the new statute, the solitary confinement population was
392—5.1% of total population. In no month since then has it exceeded 343
people, and it has averaged 316 people and 4.2% of total population.112
B. Indiana
In Indiana, as in Massachusetts and other states, solitary confinement
has been used for many decades, and prisoners have consistently objected to
both their assignment to solitary and its conditions. For example, a class
action injunction that regulated conditions of confinement at the Indiana
Reformatory from the 1980s through 2002 included both procedural and
substantive constraints on the use of solitary.113 As other states and the federal
government embraced supermax confinement, so too did Indiana, opening
its first supermax in 1991 and its second in 1993.114 Prisoners immediately
protested harsh conditions; of the thirty-five prisoners housed in the
supermax in late 1991, at least sixteen conducted a long hunger strike, which
ended only when the state obtained a force-feeding court order. Several
110
See 103 MASS. CODE REGS. 430.05 (2019); Katie Rose Quandt, Massachusetts Department of
Correction Gives a Lesson in How to Get Around Solitary Confinement Reforms, SOLITARY WATCH
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://solitarywatch.org/2019/11/20/massachusetts-department-of-correction-gives-alesson-in-how-to-get-around-solitary-confinement-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/EV58-9JP3].
111
An Act to Provide Criminal Justice Reform Protections to All Prisoners in Segregated
Confinement, S. 2413, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019) (introduced Aug. 12, 2019).
112
For the weekly overall population, see Weekly Inmate Count 2020, MASS.GOV,
https://www.mass.gov/lists/weekly-inmate-count-2020 [https://perma.cc/NAM8-XJN8]; Weekly Inmate
Count
2019,
MASS.GOV,
https://www.mass.gov/lists/weekly-inmate-count-2019
[https://perma.cc/YG3W-3EMD]. For the monthly solitary confinement population, see Weekly
Restrictive Housing Counts, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/lists/monthly-restrictive-housing-counts
[https://perma.cc/YFY7-VB4Q]. I post a longitudinal spreadsheet with month-by-month data at this
Essay’s
technical
appendix,
available
at
http://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Pages/Publications.aspx
[https://perma.cc/FN3J-UNEP].
113
French v. Miller, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=703
[https://perma.cc/5TR5-LWAG].
114
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPER-MAXIMUM SECURITY CONFINEMENT IN
INDIANA (1997), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/usind/ [https://perma.cc/N7DS-EWZZ]
[hereinafter COLD STORAGE].
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months later, seeking to enlist outside support, a prisoner in the supermax
cut off one of his fingertips to send to the ACLU as a cry for help.115 The
prisoners were unable to gain much political traction, although there was one
well-attended protest of solitary confinement conditions.116 Prisoners also
filed over a dozen lawsuits, pro se, in federal district court. The class action
litigation that followed, Taifa v. Bayh,117 began in 1992 (first in state court,
then quickly removed to federal court). With the ACLU of Indiana serving
as class counsel, Taifa consolidated many of the pro se cases before Chief
Judge Allen Sharp, a Nixon appointee. The case was limited to just one
supermax—the “Maximum Control Complex” (MCC), part of Indiana’s
Westville prison. Its attack was comprehensive—as summarized upon
settlement by the magistrate judge, it alleged that long-term solitary
confinement at the MCC “subjects [the plaintiff class to] sensory deprivation
and arbitrary and irrational rules, physically abuses them, denies them
visitation and medical and psychiatric care, and deprives them of
educational, vocational, recreational, and other rehabilitative programs,” in
violation of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment.118 Among
the allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement were
denial of telephone privileges and use of radios and televisions; arbitrary
discipline; the removal of bedding as punishment for minor infractions;
extremely cold temperatures within the facility; restrictions on visitation;
limited out-of-cell time; constantly illuminated cells; prohibiting the display of
personal items; denial of vocational, educational and rehabilitative
opportunities; denial of meaningful recreation and exercise time; contaminated
drinking water; restricted access to the courts and inadequate law library;
tampering with prisoner mail; confiscation of religious materials; restrictions
on taking Bible study correspondence courses; unavailability of commissary
items; verbal harassment; physical abuse; and denial of adequate medical and
mental health care.119

The settlement was equally comprehensive. Again, as summarized by
the magistrate judge:
In general, the Agreed Entry would provide for: the assignment of prisoners to
the MCC only under specified conditions; the transfer of prisoners out of the
115
Id.; see also Aaron Isby-Israel, Indiana Prisoners Must Unite & Struggle to Change Conditions!,
IDOC WATCH (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.idocwatch.org/blog-1/israel-indiana-prisoners-must-uniteand-struggle [https://perma.cc/X85A-ERMT].
116
See NANCY KURSHAN, OUT OF CONTROL: A FIFTEEN YEAR BATTLE AGAINST CONTROL UNIT
PRISONS 151–53 (2013).
117
See
Taifa
v.
Bayh,
C.R.
LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=706 [https://perma.cc/2LEM-FE9V].
118
Taifa v. Bayh, 846 F. Supp. 723, 724 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
119
Id. at 725.
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MCC after a specified period of time, provided that certain conditions are met;
a commissary at the MCC, with a list of particular items to be made available;
inmate access to radios and televisions under specified conditions and at inmate
expense; expanded visitation and telephone privileges; the availability of
additional reading materials for prisoners; increased opportunities for prisoner
recreation; increased privileges with respect to keeping of personal property in
cells and in the storage room; improvements in the condition of bedding; a
decrease in the intensity of the 24-hour lights in the cells; additional access by
prisoners to personal hygienic items; the establishment of a policy concerning
the use of force by DOC personnel; expanded provisions for medical care,
including mandatory psychiatric evaluations for all prisoners upon their
admittance to the MCC; an expanded law library containing specified reference
materials, and provisions for greater access to legal materials by prisoners;
increased educational opportunities for prisoners; a substance abuse program;
and improvements in inmate grievance procedures.120

As the quotation makes clear, Taifa was mostly a conditions case. But
its settlement did have significant terms governing who could be assigned to
the MCC—only prisoners with a documented history, during the current
term of incarceration, of “[e]scapes with attempts to cause physical harm to
staff, other prisoners, and/or the public at large, or to cause serious
destruction to the physical plant”; “[a]ssaultive behavior against staff and/or
prisoners causing serious bodily injury and/or death”; “[r]ioting or inciting
to riot or violence causing the serious disruption of the orderly management
of a facility or unit”; “[i]ntensive involvement in violent gang activities”; or
“[a]ggressive sexual conduct and/or rape.”121 Moreover, the settlement
provided that “[p]risoners diagnosed as mentally ill shall not be incarcerated
in MCC.”122 Nonetheless, the State’s settlement-mandated retrospective
review of all the MCC prisoners yielded few, if any, releases.123 And the
settlement did not control assignments to Indiana’s other supermax or to
solitary confinement in any other state prison. In addition, in late 1996, the
settlement was modified to allow use of the facility for long-term

120

Id. at 726.
Agreed Entry at 2, Taifa v. Bayh, 846 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 1994) (No. S-92-00429M), available at https://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-IN-0006-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJ2WDXM2].
122
Id.
123
Taifa v. Bayh, No. 3:92cv429AS, 1995 WL 803816, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 1995) (describing
a review in which line-level staff flagged about twenty-six prisoners for further consideration, but a
“classification analyst” concluded that there were “maybe two offenders that didn’t meet particular
criteria,” of whom at least one was then deemed appropriately assigned). The district court disposition of
this issue was reversed on appeal, but the ultimate outcome is unclear. See Komyatti v. Bayh, 96 F.3d
955, 964 (7th Cir. 1996).
121
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disciplinary segregation, even if the classification criteria listed above were
not met.124
The Taifa settlement induced the State to allow Human Rights Watch
full investigative access to Indiana’s two supermaxes. The resulting report,
Cold Storage,125 became an important document in nationwide advocacy.
The Taifa settlement lasted nearly a decade before it was terminated in
2003,126 but it did not reduce the use of solitary confinement. Indeed, as
settlement implementation began, the number of Indiana prisoners in solitary
confinement rose.127
Just two years after the termination of the Taifa settlement, in 2005, the
ACLU of Indiana filed another anti-solitary federal court class action. Mast
v. Donohue128 focused on Indiana’s second supermax facility, the Secured
Housing Unit at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. The resulting
settlement required that prisoners with serious mental illness (defined as
Axis I disorders—that is, psychosis and mood disorders—or a “mental
disorder that is worsened by confinement in the SHU”) not be housed at
Wabash Valley.129 Instead, such prisoners were to receive necessary
psychiatric services at other, less anti-therapeutic institutions or in general
population units.130 In implementation, however, plaintiffs’ counsel, ACLU
lawyer Kenneth Falk, observed that the result was simply shifting those same
prisoners to less regulated facilities, where they continued to violate prison
rules as a result of their mental illness and to receive decades of disciplinary
solitary confinement as a result.131
Indiana’s third large solitary confinement litigation, filed in 2008,
attempted to address this issue. In Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services
Commission v. Commissioner, Indiana Department of Correction (IPAS),132
124

COLD STORAGE, supra note 114, at 18.
Id.
126
Taifa v. Bayh, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=706
[https://perma.cc/TAG3-LV58].
127
See supra Table 1.
128
See Mast v. Indiana Department of Corrections, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5554 [https://perma.cc/JAZ6-G5S5] (describing factual
background).
129
Private Settlement Agreement at 3, Mast v. Donahue, No. 2:05-cv-00037 LJM/WGH (S.D. Ind.
Jan. 1, 2007), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-IN-0013-0002.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4GYX-VZFG].
130
Id.
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Telephone Interview with Kenneth Falk, supra note 5.
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No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 6738517, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012). For a case
description, see Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services (IPAS) Commission v. Commissioner, Indiana
Department
of
Correction,
C.R.
LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE,
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the ACLU of Indiana represented Indiana’s Protection and Advocacy agency
and the class of prisoners with mental illness housed in “settings . . . that
feature extended periods of time in cells, including, but not limited to,
prisoners in disciplinary segregation, administrative segregation, or in the
New Castle Psychiatric Unit.”133 This time, the State declined to settle;
plaintiffs won a five-day bench trial in 2011, and the district court entered a
finding that prisoners with mental illness in solitary confinement were
receiving constitutionally inadequate mental health care.134
The parties entered into remedial negotiations and, in 2016, jointly
submitted a proposed agreement that generally prohibited solitary
confinement of seriously mentally ill prisoners.135 The definition of seriously
mentally ill prisoners was more precise than in Mast:
a. Prisoners determined to have a current diagnosis or recent significant history
of schizophrenia, delusional disorder, schizophreniform disorder,
schizoaffective disorder, brief psychotic disorder, substance-induced psychotic
disorder (excluding intoxication and withdrawal), undifferentiated psychotic
disorder, bipolar I or II disorders;
b. Prisoners diagnosed with any other validated mental illness that is clinically
severe, based on evidence-based standards, and that results in significant
functional impairment; and
c. Prisoners diagnosed with an intellectual or developmental disability or other
cognitive disorder that results in a significant functional impairment.136

The settlement went into effect in March 2016 for what was initially set
as a three-year term. This was later extended (in exchange for finally
terminating the Mast litigation). So IPAS remains in implementation.137 This
time, plaintiffs’ counsel reports significant success. Ken Falk, the ACLU
lawyer who led this litigation, said,
It has removed almost all seriously mentally ill prisoners from seg[regation].
There’s an exception for those who are deemed too dangerous to move and at
any time there are 10 to 15 [prisoners in that category], but hundreds have been

http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11187 [https://perma.cc/J5MA-S6AL] [hereinafter IPAS
Summary].
133
No. 1:08-cv-01317-RLY-JMS, 2010 WL 1737821, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2010).
134
IPAS, 2012 WL 6738517, at *25.
135
See IPAS Summary, supra note 132.
136
Stipulation to Enter into Private Settlement Agreement at 15, Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs.
Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD (S.D. Ind. Jan. 27, 2016),
available
at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/MH-IN-0002-0013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FCH4-L96E]. The agreement further defined “[re]cent significant history” and
“[s]ignificant functional impairment.” Id.
137
See IPAS Summary, supra note 132.
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removed. And many of them end up going through step down units and getting
back into general population. So that has worked. But I do not think it has
reduced markedly the number of other persons who are in segregation. 138

Court-filed status reports likewise document the general exclusion of
prisoners who meet the class definition from ordinary solitary confinement;
they are housed, instead, in units in which they receive increased out-of-cell
time and therapeutic programming.139 A September 2018 site visit by a
jointly chosen forensic psychologist concluded that, moreover, the mental
health units “are no longer best understood as a way to get inmates out of
restrictive housing. Basically they have become very appropriate ways to
meet the mental health needs of inmates. I congratulate the parties for this
achievement.”140
But even assuming that the State reaches full compliance with the IPAS
agreement (once the COVID-19 pandemic passes), what about prisoners who
do not have serious mental illness? For them, as Falk reports above, Mast
and IPAS have not accomplished much. There is no indication that use of
solitary confinement is decreasing in Indiana.141 And length of stay is
unusually high in Indiana as well.142 For prisoners who are not mentally ill,
the incrementalist approach seems to fall far short.
138

Telephone Interview with Kenneth Falk, supra note 5.
See First Joint Status Report Following Effective Date of Private Settlement Agreement at 2, Ind.
Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD,
2012 WL
6738517
(S.D.
Ind.
Oct.
18,
2016),
available
at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/MH-IN-0002-0016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J4RJ-T944];
Second Joint Status Report Following Effective Date of Private Settlement Agreement at 1–2, Ind. Prot.
& Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL
6738517 (S.D. Ind. July. 5, 2017), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/MH-IN0002-0017.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYZ9-CBBG]; Third Joint Status Report Following Effective Date of
Private Settlement Agreement at 1, Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of
Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 6738517 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2018), available at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/MH-IN-0002-0018.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZG3-B899].
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Sept.
4,
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However, shortly after the September 2018 site visit, implementation hit an unexpected obstacle; the new
unit was destroyed by a fire. Substitute space has made compliance impossible, leading the plaintiffs to
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[https://perma.cc/SD3W-CT5W].
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Two more recent due process cases, both initiated by prisoners pro se,
may make some limited headway for a broader population. In both, initial
losses in district court were reversed by the Seventh Circuit, leading to large
money damages on remand. Isby-Israel v. Wynn143 was brought by Aaron
Isby-Israel—a very frequent litigant and one of the hunger strikers and
named plaintiffs in the Taifa litigation.144 Isby-Israel had been in solitary
confinement for over twenty-five years.145 He filed his case pro se but
eventually attracted volunteer counsel. Although he lost an Eighth
Amendment challenge to conditions, in 2017, he managed to reverse the
State’s due process summary judgment on appeal.146 On remand, represented
by “biglaw” litigator Daniel Kelley, Isby-Israel’s discovery uncovered that
the periodic classification reviews promised by regulation were a sham:
[P]eriodic reviews must be meaningful and cannot be a sham or pretext for
indefinite segregation. They cannot rely only on past events, nor can they only
include uninformative boilerplate language. In this case, periodic reviews must
consider Mr. Isby’s current circumstances and future prospects, in addition to
the reasons for his placement in solitary confinement when determining whether
his continued solitary confinement is warranted.
It is plain from the record that the 30-day reviews at Wabash Valley were
perfunctory, meaningless, and not even rubber stamped. The identical forms
with the same language were printed out each month by a single reviewer, a
caseworker or casework manager. No factual basis or rationale is provided in
the 30-day reviews, leaving the basis for “no changes” in status entirely
unknown.147

The IPAS litigation provided some of the evidence base for the case;
the IPAS settlement required periodic mental health reviews of individuals
in solitary, and those reviews helped substantiate Isby-Israel’s argument that
he could safely be released from solitary.148 In December 2018, Isby-Israel
in restrictive housing than the national average and it uses shorter 15 day to 3 months sanctions far less
than the national average.”).
143
No. 2:12-cv-116-JMS-MJD, 2014 WL 2866197 (S.D. Ind. June 24, 2014). For additional
resources and documents, see Isby-Israel v. Wynn, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17397 [https://perma.cc/86PR-UC2L].
144
Isby-Israel was, in fact, one of the named plaintiffs who objected to that litigation’s 1994
settlement, arguing that it was insufficiently advantageous to plaintiffs. See Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191,
1194 (7th Cir. 1996).
145
See Isby-Israel, supra note 115.
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Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 530 (7th Cir. 2017).
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Isby-Israel v. Wynn, No. 2:12-cv-00116-JMS-MJD, slip op. at 23–24 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 19, 2018),
available
at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-IN-0026-0001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9H4W-LVYL].
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won over $336,500 in compensatory and punitive damages, plus attorneys’
fees and an injunction directing his return to a general population (though
“restricted movement”) unit.149 Appeal is pending.150 Soon thereafter, in
Vermillion v. Plank,151 with the assistance of counsel recruited from the
MacArthur Justice Center at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, intense
district court litigation in a similar case ended with a November 2019
settlement of $425,000 in damages for long-term solitary prisoner Jay
Vermillion.152
These two damage actions could have several effects on solitary reform.
They seem likely to encourage additional litigation including, perhaps, a
class action. They may induce the actual implementation of the regulatory
procedural protections. And they have generated substantial information on
the state’s (non)compliance with solitary regulations. In addition to
information that the state was not, in fact, conducting the required periodic
reviews, an expert report in Vermillion offered Indiana access to developing
best practices elsewhere. The expert, former Washington Department of
Corrections head Dan Pacholke, rebuked Indiana’s practices. He noted that
appropriate classification limits (those stemming from the Taifa litigation)
were in place for “Department-Wide Administrative Segregation.”153 But, he
wrote, “Facility Administrative Segregation” was far looser—allowed
whenever “a documented history of behavior that causes staff to believe that
that the offender’s continued presence in general population would be
detrimental to the security of the facility, among others.”154 The report
criticized this provision as far too general to induce appropriate
classification, and documented abusive practices in the particular case in
court—when vague suspicions relating to an attempted escape never led to a
149
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disciplinary charge but were instead the undisclosed motivation for longterm administrative segregation.155 Moreover, he described conditions in
solitary confinement as poor, writing of his 2018 site visit: “I find it
surprising that given [the Indiana Department of Correction’s (IDOC)]
history of being litigated against over super max conditions of confinement
and the Human Rights Watch report issued more than two decades ago, that
IDOC does not demonstrate more acuity around the condition and
management of these units.”156
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
It may help to summarize the accounts just presented in a timeline:
TABLE 2: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND REFORM TIMELINE
Nationwide

Massachusetts

Indiana

1960s and 1970s: Litigated
regulation of solitary confinement
conditions
1983: Marion lockdown, rise of
modern supermax
1995: Madrid v. Gomez (N.D.
Cal.) decision holding solitary
confinement not per se
unconstitutional, though it may be
for prisoners with mental illness
1995: Sandin v. Conner (U.S.)
holding short-term solitary
confinement not a liberty
deprivation triggering due process
protections
2005: Wilkinson v. Austin (U.S.)
holding long-term supermax
confinement does trigger due
process protections

~2000–present: Specialpopulations litigation

155
156
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1988: Hoffer v. Fair
regulates administrative 1991 and 1993: Supermaxes opened
solitary
1990s: MDOC revamps
disciplinary solitary to
escape Hoffer-related
constraints

1992: Taifa v. Bayh (N.D. Ind.)
challenges supermax conditions;
settlement reached in 1994, lasts
until 2003

1998: Legal challenge
in Torres v.
Commissioner to longterm disciplinary
solitary fails

2005: Mast v. Donahue (S.D. Ind.)
2007: DLC v. MDOC
bars solitary confinement of
filed, addressing
prisoners with serious mental
solitary confinement of illness, but fails because it applies
prisoners with serious
to only one prison
mental illness; settled in
2012; settlement lasts 2008: IPAS v. Commissioner (S.D.
until 2015, when it is
Ind.) seeks to extend bar to all
codified
prisoners with serious mental
illness; settlement reached in 2016
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Massachusetts

Indiana

2012: Isby-Israel v. Wynn (S.D.
Ind.) filed; concluded in 2018;
granting damages and injunctive
2018: Criminal justice
relief for long-term solitary prisoner
reform includes
~2011–present: Return to
because reclassifications were a
significant and broad
wholesale litigation in some states
sham
limits on solitary
confinement
2015: Vermillion v. Plank (S.D.
Ind.) filed; settled in 2019; similar
to Isby-Israel

Neither of the case studies just presented offers any sign that the
litigated amelioration of solitary confinement in Massachusetts and Indiana
has been perverse. That is, there is no indication in either state that the
special-populations approach has entrenched or legitimated solitary
confinement more broadly. Neither state has seen a recent increase in the use
of solitary confinement or reported worsening of conditions in solitary.
But Massachusetts seems poised on the verge of broad solitary
confinement reform, and Indiana does not. Why? It seems to me (and to
my—highly informed—interview subjects157) that the primary reason is that
in Indiana, the litigators are on their own. To quote Amy Fettig, the former
director of the ACLU’s Stop Solitary campaign, Indiana “had successful
litigation, but there was no ground game.” It is all but impossible to achieve
real change without “a social movement to support you,” she says.158
Indiana’s political culture lacks such movement actors. That lack is far from
random: generally, Indiana is far more politically conservative than
Massachusetts.159 As Dan Kelley, who won over $300,000 for Aaron IsbyIsrael, said, “I have a hard time thinking how political [solitary confinement
reform] would be feasible in this state. Reform has to happen through the
courts.”160 And more specifically, there is simply no effective out-of-court
prisoners’ rights activism. Maggie Filler, who won over $400,000 for her
client Jay Vermillion, explained, “I do think that there’s a lack of grassroots
groups making noise.”161 Without out-of-court backup, Indiana’s state
157
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government is not pressured to learn from its litigation losses. No allies in
the legislature pick up settlement terms and run with them. No large-scale
protests force the state to justify its practices.
The point is not that litigation fails in these circumstances. It may well
be that litigation has greatly improved the lives of Indiana prisoners with
serious mental illness who are avoiding solitary confinement. And future
litigation may actually induce the substitution of real process for the current
“perfunctory, meaningless, and not even rubber stamped” reviews of
prisoners in solitary.162 There may even be some small additional benefits
caused by litigation’s role in bringing new kinds of officials into the system.
To quote Kenneth Falk, “There are mental health positions now within the
DOC that never existed before. [There’s a] guy . . . who sort of rides herd on
all of this; that wasn’t a position that they had [before]. I think that makes a
difference.”163
But for litigation to trigger something much bigger—broad reform or
significant steps towards solitary abolition—requires more. In
Massachusetts, the political ecosystem has many more reform-minded
participants—activists, lawyers, judges, legislators—than does the much
redder Indiana. Each such participant can build on the others. In
Massachusetts, litigation’s strengths can emerge, among them information
generation, thoughtful policy development (in settlement terms), publicity,
and storytelling. Weaknesses—the detachment of litigation from
mobilization, hyper-empowerment of lawyers, undue affection for process—
are ameliorated by other actors and other actions. The Indiana ecosystem is
far sparser.
In my view, the most likely path to abolition or near-abolition of solitary
confinement will create and then build on incremental change. The point is
both technocratic and also jurisprudential. Jurisprudentially, consider a 2015
concurring opinion inviting broad Eighth Amendment challenges to solitary
confinement, in which Justice Kennedy wrote:
[R]esearch still confirms what this Court suggested over a century ago: Years
on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price . . . . In a case that presented
the issue, the judiciary may be required, within its proper jurisdiction and
authority, to determine whether workable alternative systems for long-term
confinement exist, and, if so, whether a correctional system should be required
to adopt them.164
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That is, abolishing solitary is more feasible—and may even be found to be
constitutionally compelled—if “workable alternative systems for long-term
confinement exist.”
More technocratically, solitary confinement’s persistence in American
corrections policy is attributable in part to officials believing in its efficacy
as an antidote to in-prison violence. I think that belief is incorrect, but to
address it will take persuasion as well as politics. And incremental reforms
can be persuasive for all the reasons touched on throughout this Essay; they
can demonstrate the possibilities, building both reform capacity and
credibility. They introduce, as well, some much needed humility: the
asserted “need” for solitary confinement is undermined by every day that
passes without incident for a person who was previously said to need solitary
confinement.
To use the language of left theory, it seems to me that the kinds of
incremental reforms undertaken in Massachusetts and Indiana have the
potential to be “nonreformist reforms”: reforms that avoid the reformist trap
of legitimizing an unjust system, instead “reduc[ing] the power of an
oppressive system while illuminating the system’s inability to solve the
crises it creates.”165 How do nonreformist reforms work? To quote Professor
Mark Tushnet, who was writing more generally, if reforms truly are to be
“nonreformist,” they must either “set in train a larger transformation of the
political system,” or “the effort to secure such reforms might mobilize people
to seek additional reforms, even if the particular effort fails or if it produces
legislation that is itself not really a reform.”166 Reforms fail to be
“nonreformist” if they are too tame—but if they are too aggressive, they
simply fail. Again, quoting Professor Tushnet, they must be “not far out of
line with the ordinary legislative product of an unreformed political system,
so political activists can realistically place them on the political agenda.”167
In Massachusetts, there is, right now, the possibility that a nonreformist
reform of solitary confinement is underway. In Indiana, not so much. But in
neither state do the limits of reform appear counterproductive rather than
merely limited.
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